The Continuing Debate on Corporate Governance by Grant, J. Kirkland
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 4 
1982 
The Continuing Debate on Corporate Governance 
J. Kirkland Grant 
Delaware Law School of Widener University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. K. Grant, The Continuing Debate on Corporate Governance, 80 MICH. L. REV. 963 (1982). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/53 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE CONTINUING DEBATE ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
J. Kirkland Grant* 
THE MODERN CORPORATE MANAGER: RESPONSIBILITY AND 
REGULATION. By William A. Groening. New York: McGraw Hill. 
1981. Pp. xii, 274. $24.95. 
THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER: EXISTING CONSTRAINTS ON 
THE EXERCISE OF CORPORATE DISCRETION. By Ira M. Millstein and 
Salem M. Katsh. New York: MacMillan. 1981. Pp. xx, 265. 
$19.95. 
The debate on the role of governmental restrictions on business 
corporations is as old as corporations themselves. When the modem 
American business corporation came of age early in the nineteenth 
century, federal and state enabling legislation restricted corporate 
power, much as the English precedents dating back to the explora-
tion and trading corporations of Elizabethan times had done.1 Al-
though the location, form, and scope of these restrictions have 
changed dramatically over time, there is little doubt that the debate 
between proponents and opponents of the restraint of private enter-
prise will continue throughout the 1980s. Large' corporations domi-
nate the economic scene in the United States,2 and multinational 
enterprises - most privately owned, but some having a state owner-
ship interest - have come to dominate the world economy. The 
very size of these enterprises and the domestic and political impact 
* Dean and Professor of Law, The Delaware Law School of Widener University. B.B.A. 
1965; J.D. 1967, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
1. Of course, the history of the American corporate form of doing business must refer to 
the Dartmouth College case, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
518 (1819), where the state attempted to restrict the powers previously granted the college by 
the legislature in the Dartmouth charter. Chief Justice Marshall found such an attempt uncon-
stitutional as an abridgment of contract. Thereafter, enabling legislation has normally 
contained a reservation of power to meet just such a situation. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 555 (10th ed. 1980). 
2. In the second quarter of 1981, corporate profits in the United States totalled $187 bil-
lion. SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1981, at 1 (the Survey is a publication of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce). In 1974, 72% of the profits and 
66% of the sales of all United States industrial firms were attributable to the 500 largest indus-
trial corporations. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORA-. 
TION 16 (1976). The profits of the Fortune 500 largest industrial companies totaled $81.2 
billion in 1980. FORTUNE, May 4, 1981, at 322. 
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of their attendant power are a source of considerable public concern. 
The debate thus centers on the ownership and control of this eco-
nomic power and how it should be regulated - by the free enter-
prise economy or through governmental constraints. Two questions 
are particularly relevant. First, should these enterprises be permitted 
to continue to combine and grow? And second, must governmental 
regulatory schemes also grow larger and more complex to adjust to 
the size of the large corporations? Or is there some middle ground, 
where a corporation and the government can properly respond to 
society's legitimate demand for efficient services and fairly priced 
quality products? The authors of both The Modern Corporate Man-
ager and The Limits of Corporate Power have given some focus to 
this debate on corporate size and governance. 
I 
The scope of the coverage in both books is striking. Groening, 
retired corporate counsel of the Dow Chemical Company, ostensibly 
addresses himself to the civil and criminal sanctions applied to all 
levels of the corporation - the enterprise and its officers, directors, 
and other managerial personnel who have day-to-day responsibili-
ties. This personal approach is in contrast to the more theoretical 
coverage of Millstein and Katsh, both partners in a New York City 
law firm. They examine the legal aspects of government regulation, 
but also discuss the economic, political, and social environment in 
which private enterprise must operate today. Both books deal with 
existing constraints on corporate power, Groening in sometimes 
painful detail, Millstein and Katsh generally and philosophically. 
The authors all try to carry forward the debate over the advisability 
of more (or less) governmental restraint on corporate activity. Mill-
stein and Katsh note: 
Undoubtedly, some readers will conclude that a sufficient number of 
effective constraints exist in all (if not too many) areas, while others 
will assert the inadequacy of the present matrix [of corporate freedom 
of action and statutory or economic constraint] on both quantitative 
and qualitative grounds. And there will obviously be a wide spectrum 
of opinion in between. What we stress here is only that a complex 
matrix of constraining forces [limiting the exercise of a large corpora-
tion's power in any or all areas] does exist, and that if the country is 
seriously concerned about the issues of corporate size and governance, 
it behooves us all to enter the discussion with a solid basis of facts 
about the accountability of corporations today. [P. xx.] 
Whatever side one takes in the debate - for or against more govern-
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mental regulation of corporations - all will surely find a wealth of 
interesting material in both books. 
Both texts discuss the effect of governmental influence on corpo-
rate decision-making (what I believe Groening would call govern-
ment interference). Each finds the scope of governmental regulation 
to be quite pervasive. Millstein and Katsh give several illustrations, 
including: 
- The General Accounting Office has identified one hundred and 
sixteen federal agencies with regulatory responsibilities, and simply 
cataloging the myriad different programs takes hundreds of pages. [P. 
129.]3 
- [F]ederal laws and regulations seeking to achieve environmental 
goals have over the past ten years mandated an enormous allocation of 
capital resources to the protection and enhancement of the environ-
ment. Many companies have been forced to spend as much as 20 per-
cent of their capital and 10 percent of their operating budgets for 
pollution control. [P. 166.]4 
-The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act5 ••• requires that cor-
porate activities designed to influence the passage of legislation must 
be disclosed. This alone can serve to diminish the flexibility available 
to the corporation since it may decide it would prefer not going on 
record with respect to a particular issue. [P. 201.] 
What these points fail to draw to the reader's attention is that 
most regulatory measures adopted by Congress or the state legisla-
tures were enacted to correct perceived corporate abuses (Groening, 
p. 264). These measures are the products of a delicate balancing pro-
cess. On the one hand, society is increasingly suspicious of the uses 
to which the very powers it has granted corporations are being put. 
We resist nationalization or overregulation, but are equally repelled 
by corporate libertinism. On the other hand, the larger corporations 
grow, the more important to the national interest their performance 
becomes. Consequently, corporations and the government must 
work together to find an acceptable middle road (Millstein & Katsh, 
pp. xvi-xvii). How these competing interests will ultimately be re-
3. (Citing REl'oRT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL 
REGULATORY PROGRAMS AND ACI'IVITIES (1978)). The authors then select a limited number 
of areas as illustrations of the governmental regulation phenomenon: labor relations, includ-
ing occupational safety and health, pp. 147-66; environmental laws, pp. 166-78; consumer pro-
tection of the FfC, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and consumer credit laws, pp. 
178-96; the political process, including campaign financing, corporate lobbying activities, and 
foreign corrupt practices, pp. 196-206; and an energy discussion of information gathering, 
price regulation, conservation and encouragement of technological development through di-
rect federal loans or investment and encouragement of private investment, pp. 206-20. 
4. (Citing [1978) 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1378-79). 
5. 2 u.s.c. §§ 261-270 (1976). 
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solved is far from clear. In 1932, Professors Berle and Means 
predicted: 
The rise of the modem corporation has brought a concentration of eco-
nomic power which can compete on equal terms with the modem state 
- economic power versus political power, each strong in its own field. 
The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation, while the 
corporation, steadily becoming more [economically and politically] 
powerful, makes every effort to avoid such regulation. Where its own 
interests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state. The 
future may see the economic organism, now typified by the corpora-
tion, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even super-
seding it as the dominant force of social organization.6 
They thought that the political power of corporations would quickly 
grow to match their economic power. 
It is interesting to note that Berle and Means's 1968 revised edi-
tion, in contrast to their 1932 volume, concluded that the twentieth-
century American economic revolution had made the corporation a 
dominant form of organization and production, but had left it a rela-
tively neutral political force.7 Since 1968, however, the situation has 
changed. Corporate organizations, such as the Business Roundtable 
( one of the sponsors of the Millstein book), as well as individual cor-
porations, have become more politically active. One only has to 
open general circulation magazines and newspapers to see public in-
terest, nongeneric advertising on issues of social concern, bought and 
paid for by America's largest corporations. Probably the most 
widely known are the multi-media advertisements of the Mobil Cor-
poration concerning wide-ranging issues in the energy field. Contin-
ued attempts to influence public opinion by corporations will no 
doubt have some impact on legislation and consequent government 
regulation. The conclusion of Berle and Means that corporate power 
is politically neutral, therefore, will bear close scrutiny. 
II 
In attempting to resolve this central problem, the two books take 
very different approaches. Each is directed at a different audience. 
Groening writes for modem corporate managers - those who 
through their activities will cause legal sanctions to be visited on the 
corporation and possibly themselves. A detailed checklist examining 
many diverse areas of civil and criminal law is the result. This 
6. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 357 
(1932). 
7. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY at XXV• 
xx.vi (rev. ed. 1968). 
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checklist traces corporate and individual responsibility, sometimes in 
excruciating detail. It is doubtful, for example, that any corporate 
manager will want to know all of the facts of a 1973 Louisiana 
Supreme Court decision8 on the liability of a corporate manager, as 
a principal, for the activities of subordinates. It is similarly doubtful 
that the manager will peruse the details of section 16(b) of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934,9 the discussion of which covers ten 
pages, as opposed to just one paragraph covering shareholder pro-
posals under rule 14a-810 of that same statute. In fact, it seems likely 
that Groening overwhelmingly emphasizes those areas of govern-
mental regulation with which he was concerned while general coun-
sel of Dow Chemical. Food and drug regulation, environmental 
regulation, the securities laws (particularly the provisions of the 1934 
Act concerning insider stock transactions), and ERISA, 11 are given 
very detailed discussion, much beyond that required to give manag-
ers insight into the legal rules and sanctions affecting their employ-
ment behavior. 
Millstein and Katsh, on the other hand, have resisted an author's 
normal tendency to write about everything that he has experienced 
in a given area and have thus produced a much more readable text. 
The Limits of Corporate Power attempts to sketch the economic, so-
cial, and political limits on a corporation's power to act, and is not 
merely a checklist of the various regulations affecting corporations. 
Both texts are well-researched and impressively footnoted. The 
serious reader will appreciate the trouble that the authors have taken 
in the footnotes to draw attention to the applicable statutes and 
agency regulations, as well as to the important commentary of legal 
scholars. Mr. Groening approaches his sources as a classical corpo-
rations scholar, citing many of the well-known leaders in the field 
since the 1930s. He uses the works of Berle and Means, Alfred Con-
ard, William Cary, Ernest Folk, and the treatment of corporate 
problems in the major law reviews, including the American Bar As-
sociation Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law's Busi-
ness Lawyer, to illustrate the principles that he outlines. Millstein 
and Katsh have adopted a more modem approach in their thought-
ful text. While they, too, cite the 1970s articles discussing the role of 
the corporation, their volume is mea1;lt to stimulate the reader's 
8. P. 14 (discussing Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973)). 
9. 15 u.s.c. § 78p (1976). 
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1981). 
11. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 
& Supp. III 1979). 
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thought by general consciousness raising. As noted above, both 
volumes provide citations to regulations and statutory sections in 
massive detail. I often wondered if this was really necessary, espe-
cially in the Millstein and Katsh book. Groening includes the cita-
tions because he hopes that his readers - corporate managers who 
are not legally trained - may find them helpful as they confront 
particular problems in their day-to-day activities. 
Both books discuss the regulations relating to the creation, struc-
ture, and management of the corporation, including the limited lia-
bility and management roles of shareholders, officers, directors, and 
managers.12 Groening then examines the penalties visited on corpo-
rations and their managers for violations of the laws relating to regu-
lated industries, antitrust, products liability, the environment, em-
ployee relations, and the securities laws.13 Because of his emphasis 
on the individual liability of the director, officer, and manager, he 
also discusses indemnification and liability insurance.14 Millstein 
and Katsh, after discussing the creation and structure of the corpora-
tion, look to the economic constraints of the free market (including 
the antitrust and securities laws), restraints on business activities in-
herent in the federal tax system, and the direct regulation of corpo-
rate decision-making through the labor, consumer protection, 
energy, political activity, and regulated industries laws.15 
As one would expect from the backgrounds of the authors of 
both texts, additional governmental regulation of the corporation is 
not encouraged. I particularly enjoyed the Millstein and Katsh vol-
ume because it so thoroughly questioned regulatory policy. Chapter 
three, for example, examines the federal tax system's influences on 
the discretionary powers of corporate managers. The chapter em-
phasizes the tremendous influence that the tax system has on corpo-
rate decisions relating to capitalization, mergers and other 
acquisitions, capital investment, employment, political activity, for-
eign operations, and the like. Although there is little discussion of 
the effect that state tax laws have on these decisions, 16 the federal 
income tax consequences of business decisions seem generally well 
covered. The analysis of tax policy in light of congressional intent is 
12. Millstein & Katsh, ch. I; Groening, chs. 1, 2 & 3. 
13. Chs. 4-9. 
14. Ch. 11. 
15. Chs. 2-4. 
16. A major concem of corporations today is tax abatement, forgiveness, and any other 
measures by which local and state taxing authorities provide incentive for corporate location 
and specific action that may create jobs. 
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particularly interesting. The authors consider several examples to 
determine whether the particular tax provision was intended to influ-
ence corporate decision-making. For example, they examine the dif-
ference between debt and equity financing, and note that the 
corporation is allowed no deductions from its income for dividends 
paid, but that interest on debt is normally deductible (pp. 89-91). 
They conclude: 
There is no indication Congress intended the tax system to bias corpo-
rate capitalization decisions toward debt financing . . . . [Further-
more,] the more highly dependent a corporation is on debt, the more 
vulnerable it becomes to pressures from creditors and to financial diffi-
culties in periods when the economy is weak . . . . [I]t will be placed at 
a disadvantage relative to a corporation that is not as heavily ''lever-
aged." . . . Beyond these implications, moreover, the fact that corpora-
tions are encouraged by the tax laws to incur debt may mean that the 
equity market is in a sense artificially constricted. [P. 90.] 
Over-reliance on debt financing is a side effect of the tax laws that, 
with the consequent depression in the equities market, has in tum 
produced "much of the increased merger activity in recent years" (p. 
91). In carefully explaining the complex relationships among tax 
and other business laws, Millstein and Katsh have provided a real 
service. 
In the area of tax constraints on decision-making, however, it is 
amazing how many aspects of the discussion in both books need to 
be updated as a result of the 1981 changes in the tax law.17 New 
incentives for capital investment have resulted from changes in the 
tax treatment of capital gains at a maximum long-term rate of 
twenty percent, which will significantly affect the willingness of indi-
viduals and businesses to dispose of real property, plant and equip-
ment, as well as securities; from improved depreciation and research 
and development write-offs; from the new asset life assumptions for 
depreciable property; from changes in individual and Keogh Retire-
ment Plans; and from the change permitting a ten percent charitable 
contribution deduction (raised from five percent) to encourage cor-
porate largesse at a time when individuals will probably donate less 
to charity because of changes in the estate tax laws.18 
I found the coverage in both books of corporate governance and 
social responsibility especially stimulating. Both comment on the 
oft-charged anticorporate bias in the news and broadcast media. 
This bias, the authors conclude, has placed corporations in a position 
of having to justify to the public at large both their existence and 
17. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. 
18. See Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. 
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their economic power. In light of proposed new federal regulatory 
statutes and revisions of old ones, this bias is likely to become more, 
not less, important. Millstein and Katsh illustrate the bias against 
corporations with a quotation from an article in the Harvard Business 
Review: 
Broadly speaking, mass media news selection and interpretation feeds 
the public's suspicions about corporate practice (with a certain amount 
of help from business malefactors), and interprets corporate affairs 
with a negative bias. This situation has prompted the choruses of anti-
media hates that dominate many business panel sessions and conversa-
tions . . . . There is . . . a long standing bias against corporate busi-
ness in the general media. . . . The reasons are complicated and 
range from simple ignorance of corporate practice to a mindless pur-
suit of the kinetic or sensational.19 
As a result of this activity, Millstein and Katsh conclude, "the pros-
pect of hostile press reports must be taken into account by corporate 
management in the decision-making process" (p. 233). This is not a 
ground-shaking conclusion, but a very practical one often over-
looked by corporate decision-makers. Both books take the optimis-
tic view that the multinational corporations can accomplish much in 
influencing public opinion. Groening, in particular, believes that 
they can perhaps even reverse the trend toward overregulation (p. 
254). 
III 
The real strength of both texts appears to be in the concluding 
essays. Again, similarities crop up. Both discuss the need for corpo-
rate managers to attune themselves to society's needs and to recog-
nize social values espoused by different constituencies within society. 
To the extent that the corporation's activities are able to respond to 
the needs and perceptions of society regarding responsible economic, 
employee, customer, investor, and related corporate behavior, the 
pressure for additional governmental regulation will lessen. 
The corporate organizational structure, it has been argued, is not 
responsive to public concerns. If it is true that boards of directors 
have essentially abdicated their function as watchdogs of manage-
ment (Groening, p. 233), and managers are not responsive to society's 
needs, as argued by many critics of corporations in the 1970s, forced 
change will take place.20 In fact, both authors recognize the emer-
19. P. 232 (citing BanJcs, Taking On The Hostile Media, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1978, 
at 123, 125, 129) (where the original and the reprinted versions differ, the text follows the 
original). 
20. One of the prime critics of corporate behavior has been Ralph Nader. However, he has 
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gence of a new class of directors in the large corporation, one repre-
senting a particular constituency. While "public interest" directors 
as such have probably not yet been selected, leaders of groups not 
formerly represented on corporate boards, such as unions, consumer 
groups, and minorities, have •been placed on various corporate 
boards as a result of an increased awareness by corporate manage-
ment that it is better to respond voluntarily to society's perceptions 
than to be forced to do so through legislated change.21 
The optimism of Groening and of Millstein and Katsh is conta-
gious. American business has succeeded because of the profit mo-
tive, which encourages individual initiative. A balance between 
corporate initiative and responsibility to the public as well as to in-
vestors and coworkers has become an accepted price for their contin-
uing to do business in their present form. As a new generation of 
corporate managers takes the helm in the 1980s, most of us believe 
that they will be responsive to societal needs.22 If the events in 
Washington during the past year have any bearing, government reg-
ulation at the national level will decrease. It is too early to tell 
whether this deregulation will result in adverse economic conse-
quences, such as wide-scale bankruptcies of now unregulated com-
mercial airlines or interstate truckers, or economic success, like that 
which followed the deregulation of the railroads; or if unregulated 
corporate activity will be socially detrimental because uncontrolled 
corporations will ignore their social and economic responsibilities. 
But if corporations are inherently evil because they are motivated 
solely by profit, society will again rise up and demand governmental 
constraints on corporate decision-making. In fact, pervasive abuses 
in the private sector might well cause the government to take over 
large corporations representing important segments of the national 
economy. Both books offer sobering appraisals of this possibility. 
However, those who manage the large multinational and domes-
been joined by distinguished commentators, such as former SEC Chairman and Columbia 
University Law School Professor William Cary, in calling for federal chartering and attendant 
internal regulation oflarge American companies. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION (1976); R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, 
supra note 2; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974); Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 1101 
(1974). 
21. The constituency director phenomenon is discussed in Groening, pp. 236-47, and very 
generally in Millstein & Katsh, p. 229. 
22. For other perspectives on the reform of corporate boards of directors, see, e.g., Conard, 
Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 15 MlcH. L. REV. 941 (1977); Haft, Business Decisions 
by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1981); Solo-
mon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope - Faint Promise?, 16 MICH. 
L. REV. 581 (1978). 
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tic corporations that control significant elements of our domestic and 
world economy have shown themselves to be responsive to the needs 
and desires of society. As long as a dialogue exists between the crit-
ics of the modem large corporation and corporate managers, internal 
responses to perceived problems can be achieved. Society expects 
much from the corporation and its management. It has become clear 
that the pursuit of profit can no longer be the only goal of the Ameri-
can corporation. But if corporations govern themselves with pru-
dence and awareness, governmental action constraining their 
behavior should be unnecessary. The authors of both volumes have 
provided information concerning corporate behavior that will help 
to create a meaningful dialogue on governmental regulation. This 
dialogue may, in time, result in reforms that adequately control cor-
porate behavior without resort to complicated and burdensome 
regulations. 
